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RECENT DECISIONS
In the case of Carolene Products Co. v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n,17
the constitutionality of the Filled Milk Act was also involved. There,
the plaintiff (defendant in the principal case) attacked the validity of
the Act on the basis of the decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart.8 In
that case a statute prohibiting the transportation in interstate com-
merce of goods made by child labor was declared unconstitutional
because it was a regulation not of commerce, but of child labor, a
local matter.' 9 The court pointed out, however, that, unlike the case
in which lottery tickets had been banned from interstate commerce, 20
the products of child labor were of themselves harmless, and the use
of interstate commerce was not necessary to effect an evil. 2' The situ-
ation in the case of filled milk resembles the one in the Lottery case 22
rather than the one in Hammer v. Dagenhart. The products of child
labor as such have no deleterious effect on the consumer; the use of
filled milk does have such an effect, and in such case the principle
enunciated in Hammer v. Dagenhart has no application. It was in
this view that the constitutionality of the Filled Milk Act was upheld
in the Circuit Court.
A.W.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT OF FREEDOM FROM INVASION IN
ONE'S HOUSE-POLICE PowER.-Petitioner made a motion for an
injunction to restrain the defendant from stationing police officers on
his premises. The defendant justified this action because of (1) the
suspicious external appliances such as peepholes, etc., used in connec-
tion with the supposed "grocery" and (2) the absence of any explana-
tion by the petitioner as to why thirty to fifty men habitually loitered
in the basement of the store. Held, injunction denied. The right of
freedom from invasion in one's house depends on obedience to law
and cannot be used to shield the commission of crime. Police officers
may properly be stationed on private premises to prevent the com-
mission of crime. Oriental Merchants Association v. Valentine, 167
Misc. 373, 3 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 229 (1938).
The fundamental principle that every person shall be protected in
the enjoyment of his life, liberty and his property may be traced back
to the Magna Carta and is now embodied, in some form, in every one
193 F. (2d) 202 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct 529 (1917).
Cf. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 42 Sup. Ct. 449 (1921)
(a tax on the net income of employers of child labor was held not a proper
exercise of the taxing power but a regulation of child labor).
2 See note 7, supra.
'See Hamener v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 271, 38 Sup. Ct. 529 (1917);
Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432, 438, 45 Sup. Ct. 435 (1924).
-"See note 7, supra.
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of the state constitutions.1 Nevertheless, in spite of the broad scope
of privileges included within the fundamental right of liberty and the
jealous protection by the Constitution of the rights of the individual,
it has been held that personal liberty and the enjoyment of one's prop-
erty are not rights which are absolute under all conditions and cir-
cumstances. 2  The state, by virtue of its police power, may always
subject the rights and privileges of the individual to such reasonable
restraints and regulations as are essential to the preservation of the
health, safety and welfare of the community.3
As a general rule, police officers will not be enjoined from per-
forming their duties in the exercise of the general police power,4 and
it has been so held even though the act may have been performed in
an oppressive and unlawful manner. 5 The remedy is ordinarily an
action for damages 6 or criminal prosecution.7 However, where it is
shown that the acts of the public officers will result in irreparable in-
jury to the property of the complainant if an injunction is not issued,
injunctive relief may be available s as where no claim is made that a
violation had ever been committed on the premises, 9 or where there is
nothing more than a suggestion of a suspicion that the law had ever
been violated on the premises.10
1 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273 (1887); State v. Peel
Splint Coal Co., 36 W. Va. 502, 15 S. E. 1000 (1892); Porter v. Titch, 70
Conn. 235, 39 Atl. 169 (1898) ; McKinster v. Sage, 163 Ind. 671, 72 N. E. 854
(1904).
Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 11 Sup. Ct. 13 (1890) ; Downs v.
Swann, 111 Md. 53, 73 Atl. 643 (1909); Commonwealth v. Libbey, 216 Mass.
356, 103 N. E. 923 (1914).
' State v. Morse, 84 Md. 387, 80 Atl. 189 (1911). Accord: Western Theo-
logical Seminary v. City of Evanston, 325 Ill. 511, 56 N. E. 778 (1927);
Matter of Hecke, 99 Cal. App. 747, 279 Pac. 470 (1929); Weisenberger v.
State, 202 Ind. 424, 175 N. E. 238 (1931).
'Olympic Athletic Co. v. Bingham, 125 App. Div. 792, 110 N. Y. Supp.
216 (1st Dept. 1908); Shepard v. Bingham, 125 App. Div. 784, 110 'N. Y.
Supp. 217 (1st Dept. 1908); Schimkevitz v. Bingham, 125 App. Div. 792, 110
N. Y. Supp. 219 (1st Dept. 1908); Symphony Theatre Co. v. Ely, 187 App.
Div. 757, 176 N. Y. Supp. 527 (3d Dept. 1919) ; Trenton Theatre Building Co.
v. Frith, 93 N. J. Eq. 27, 115 Atl. 340 (1921).
'Campbell v. York, 30 Misc. 340, 63 N. Y. Supp. 581 (1900); Delaney v.
Flood, 183 N. Y. 323, 76 N. E. 111 (1906); Suesskind v. Bingham, 125 App.
Div. 787, 110 N. Y. Supp. 213 (1st Dept. 1908); Kearney v. Laird, 164 Mo.
App. 406, 144 S. W. 904 (1912).
;Delaney v. Flood, 183 N. Y. 323, 76 N. E. 111 (1906); Suesskind v.
Bingham, 125 App. Div. 787, 110 N. Y. Supp. 213 (1st Dept. 1908).
"Ibid.; Stevens v. McAdoo, 112 App. Div. 458, 98 N. Y. Supp. 553 (1st
Dept. 1906).
'American Steel Co. v. Davis, 261 Fed. 800 (N. D. Ohio 1919); Hale v.
Burns, 101 App. Div. 101, 91 N. Y. Supp. 929 (2d Dept. 1905) ; Rosenberg v.
Shein, 77 N. J. Eq. 467, 77 Atl. 1019 (1910) ; Kearney v. Laird, 164 Mo. App.
406, 144 S. W. 904 (1912) ; Constantine v. N. Y. City, 116 Misc. 349, 190 N. Y.
Supp. 372 (2d Dept. 1921).
'Olms v. Bingham, 118 App. Div. 894, 103 N. Y. Supp. 1196 (2d Dept.
1907).
"o McGorie v. McAdoo, 113 App. Div. 271, 99 N. Y. Supp. 47 (1st Dept.
1906), rev'g 49 Misc. 601, 99 N. Y. Supp. 1107 (1906) (Where plaintiff con-
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RECENT DECISIONS
In the case under discussion, although the defendant could not
claim that a violation of the law had ever been committed, the court
found that he was well justified in his suspicion that gambling was
being practiced on the premises. 1  However, even if such justifica-
tion did not exist, the complainant's motion would have been denied on
equitable grounds. One of the cardinal maxims in the law of equity
is that he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.' 2  The
maxim is of ancient origin 13 and of broad application. It is based on
the equitable principle that a right cannot arise to anyone out of his
own wrong.14 The wrongful conduct, as defined by equity, is not
necessarily conduct of tortious or illegal nature but may be any un-
conscionable act resulting from a bad motive. This maxim excludes
either party from courts of equity when such party is seeking to pro-
tect a right operating against public policy.15 Similarly, one may be
barred from relief by misconduct with reference to the suit itself.
Thus, equity may refuse to protect one who fails to make a full and
free disclosure of all the facts relating to the case.'6 It follows, there-
fore, on the basis of the above principles, that the petitioner did not
apply for relief with clean hands, and so the court could not grant
him equitable relief. Moreover, the petitioner, if he would have equi-
table relief, should have made a full disclosure of all the facts relating
to the case. The facts brought out at the hearing show that the peti-
tioner failed to explain why groups of men habitually loitered in the
basement. If the court were to protect the petitioner's right of free-
dom from invasion in his house, it would have acted contrary to the
principles of public policy,' 7 and, consequently, against the principle
ducted a wallpaper business and there was no evidence of the commission of
any crime, held, the temporary injunction should be continued).
"Instant case at 230: "Until a satisfactory explanation is given for the
respectively constant attendance of thirty to fifty men in the basement of the
supposed grocery store, standing around doing nothing, the action of the police
commissioner in stationing an officer on the premises to prevent possible criminal
acts will not be interfered with, for the suspicion of gambling in the premises
is well justified."
'Koehler v. Sanders, 122 N. Y. 65, 25 N. E. 235 (1890) ; Rice v. Rocke-
feller, 134 N. Y. 194, 31 N. E. 907 (1892). Accord: Farrow v. Holland Trust
Co., 74 Hun 585, 26 N. Y. Supt. 502 (1st Dept. 1893) ; Weiss v. Herlihy, 23
App. Div. 608, 49 N. Y. Supp. 81 (1st Dept. 1897).
Bentley v. Tibbals, 223 Fed. 247 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915).
"Baird v. Howison, 154 Ala. 359, 45 So. 668 (1907); Harton v. Little,
188 Ala. 640, 65 So. 951 (1914).
' Koehler v. Sanders, 122 N. Y. 65, 25 N. E. 235 (1890); Weiss v. Herlihy,
23 App. Div. 608, 49 N. Y. Supp. 81 (1st Dept. 1897); Fay v. Larbourne, 124
App. Div. 245, 108 N. Y. Supp. 874 (1st Dept. 1908).
" Commonwealth v. Filiatreau, 161 Ky. 434, 170 S. W. 1182 (1914).
'Instant case at 229: "Whenever the actions of police are involved, sight
must not be lost of the requirements and needs of good government. No matter
how trivial the offense, it is infinitely better to avoid the commission of crime
than to await its commission and punish. In the interests of peace and order
the individual is oft compelled to suffer inconvenience, if not humiliation." At
230: "It is no new doctrine in our jurisprudence that in furtherance of order
19381
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that courts of equity will not grant relief to either party when such
party is seeking to protect a right operating against public policy.18
Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner conducted himself prop,-
erly in reference to the suit, and so he was barred from relief.
A. E. M.
CONTRACTS - ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION - NOT APPLICABLE
TO CONTRACTS FOR PAYMENT OF MONEY ONLY.-Plaintiff corpora-
tion had given to the defendant trustees a mortgage which provided
that if plaintiff was not in default, the trustees would release from the
mortgage lien any lands sold by the plaintiff, on payment to them of a
stipulated percentage of the purchase price. The plaintiff, having
contracted to sell a certain parcel of land covered by the mortgage, re-
quested the trustees to execute the necessary release. Previous to
this contract of sale, the plaintiff had notified the trustees that it had
decided not to pay an installment of interest which was due at a future
date. Consequently, the trustees refused to execute the release, aver-
ring that they had treated plaintiff's threatened default as an antici-
patory breach, and, therefore, they were no longer bound to perform
the contract according to its original tenor. In an action to compel
the defendant to execute the release, held, for plaintiff. The doctrine
of anticipatory repudiation does not apply to contracts for the pay-
ment of money only, in installments or otherwise. Indian River Corp.
v. Mfg. Trust, 253 App. Div. 549, 2 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 860 (1st Dept.
1938).
This case is in accord with previous decisions in New York 1 and
in other jurisdictions. 2 The courts of this state undoubtedly recog-
and security the police power may be exercised in the manner against which the
protagonist of this motion lodges complaint."
's See note 15, supra.
1 McReady v. Lindenborn, 172 N. Y. 400, 65 N. E. 208 (1902); Kelly v.
Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 186 N. Y. 16, 78 N. E. 584 (1906) ; Werner v.
Werner, 169 App. Div. 9, 154 N. Y. Supp. 570 (1st Dept. 1915); Bauchle v.
Bauchle, 185 App. Div. 590, 173 N. Y. Supp. 292 (1st Dept. 1918); Curov
Realty Corp. v. Powell, 246 App. Div. 832, 284 N. Y. Supp. 846 (2d Dept.
1936).
'Kevan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1 F. Supp. 719 (W. D. Mo.
1932) ; Manufacturer's Furniture Co. v. Cantrell, 172 Ark. 642, 290 S. W. 353
(1927); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Brown, 230 Ky. 534, 20 S. W. (2d) 284
(1929); see Alger-Fowler Co. v. Tracy, 98 Minn. 432, 437, 107 N. W. 1124,
1126 (1906).
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